In this relationship, religiosity defines the nation—and nationalism reinforces religiosity, leading to unusually high rates of national identification with a given religion and high rates of religiosity itself. Similarly, the substitutive relationship between nation and religion does not simply mean that the direction of displacement inevitably runs from religious to secular nationalism. These included poorhouses, schools, and hospitals, which were eventually absorbed by the nascently secular state. What he failed to predict was that the West would export its culture to the rest of the world and thus grip the entire world in its death throes. Van Cappellen, P., Fredrickson, B. L., Saroglou, V., & Corneille, O. “Speak, Lord, your servant is listening”: Religious priming activates submissive thoughts and behaviors. a) Refusing to acknowledge and support the right of individuals to have their own beliefs and related legitimate practices. Nevertheless, because of its enduring influence, it is still worthwhile to discuss this taxonomy in detail. Similarly, Fouad Ajami (1992) argued that the failure of secular Arab nationalism, based on language and advanced by secular Christian Arabs, led its supplantation by the much more religiously infused national visions of the Muslim Brotherhood. Religion is neither sufficient nor necessary for violence. Yet the existence of religiously inflected nationalism does not necessarily translate into significance or meaning: “the simple existence of popular worship, public liturgy, and political ritual does not provide any information regarding their function or effects on social integration” (Santiago, 2009, p. 440). A first consideration is that rather than the fusion of identities alone, religious nationalism also comprises an alignment of goals; where nationalism seeks political recognition and sovereignty for the nation, religious nationalism does so for a nation first and foremost defined by religion. 127–128). And what are the long-term effects of the hostility or mutual support? Where religious nationalism has equated religion with nation, and where the representative churches thus serve as representatives of the common good and the national interest, religious actors do not have to rely on pressure at the ballot box or on partisan coalitions. Past research has shown that religious beliefs are related to prejudice and antisocial attitudes especially toward value-threatening out-groups. In addition to the direct impact on public policy through institutional access, the more religious and national identities fuse, and as the churches’ moral authority increases, so does politicians’ wariness of offending organized religions (Layman, 2001; Mooney, 2001). Anthony Smith (2008) divided the participants in the debates over the origins of religious nationalism into “perennialists” and “modernists.” Perennialist scholars view national identities as reaching back before the advent of the modern nation-state, as “nations before nationalism” (Armstrong, 1997; Gillingham, 1992; Hastings, 1997; Hutchinson, 1996; O’Brien, 1994; Tomka, 1995). An early 20th-century philosopher spoke of the impending decline of the West. Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) found a rise in religious violence and that religion increasingly motivated terrorist groups (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 19). Thus, hostility between a secular state and a religious nation redounds to the latter, accentuating the chasm between the illegitimate state and the “real” religious nation. As briefly mentioned above, beyond individual beliefs, social affiliation is a core feature of religion that has important implications for church members’ social affiliation needs and their capacity to feel good and do good. Much of the research has found that religious differences do not predict either how long such conflicts last or how durable the peace is that follows, but they may influence peace settlements (Svenson, 2007). Examining culture to learn about beliefs is a common practice. Yet such mutual reinforcement does not mean a blurring of the boundaries. Nationalism necessitates and relies on the state, since “the political processes are organized through the state in the name of the nation” (Friedland, 2001, p. 138; Marx, 2003). In contrast, where the state regulates religious markets (by financially or politically supporting a state religion), the levels of religious pluralism and participation decrease. More broadly, “religion becomes an important factor in nationalist sentiment and nation formation when it is able to play some sort of differentiating role for the nation” (Barker, 2009, p. 31). Using an implicit behavioral measure of passive aggression, I found that personal religious beliefs were associated with more ingroup favoritism: in a virtual ball tossing game, throwing more often a ball to a christian than to an atheist or neutral players.